This paper tests various hypotheses about distributive politics by studying the distribution of federal spending across U.S. states over the period . We improve on previous work by using survey data to measure the share of voters in each state that are Democrats, Republicans, and independents, or liberals, conservatives and moderates. We nd no evidence for the \swing voter" hypothesis { that is, no signi cant association between the amount of federal funds a state receives and the fraction of independents or moderates in the state. We also nd no evidence for the \battleground state" hypothesis { no signi cant association between the amount of federal funds and the degree of partisan balance in a state. We nd mixed evidence for the \partisan supporters" hypothesis, which conjectures that politicians will favor areas that contain a large percentage of their core supporters.
Introduction
Distributive politics is a core issue in political economy, and scholars have developed a variety of models about how it works. In this paper we test three key hypotheses derived from these models, using data that has not previously been applied to this problem.
The rst is the \swing voter" hypothesis, which predicts that politicians will allocate larger shares of distributive goods to groups or geographic areas that contain larger percentages of indi erent voters (who are indi erent between the political parties on ideological grounds). The second is the \electoral battleground" hypothesis, according to which distributive goods should be disproportionately allocated to districts, states, or provinces where the share of supporters of each major party is closer to 50%. This hypothesis is especially relevant in systems where two major parties compete in rst-past-the-post elections with geographically de ned constituencies. The third is the \partisan supporters" hypothesis, which conjectures that politicians will favor areas that contain a large percentage of their core supporters. They might do this in order to send clear signals to voters, induce higher turnout, or avoid excessive deadweight costs. In all three cases, one underlying assumption is that politicians are mainly interested in winning elections, and o er government transfers or projects in order to appeal to voters.
Testing these hypotheses is di cult. It requires measures of government spending across groups or geographic units of some sort (the dependent variable), as well as measures of the underlying partisan leanings or ideological attitudes of voters in each group or geographic unit (the key independent variables). The dependent variable is not too much of a problem, at least if one adopts the geographic approach. This is what virtually all previous empirical studies do, using the distribution of spending across units such as districts, states, or provinces. Measuring the key independent variables, however, poses a severe challenge.
Researchers do not have good measures of the underlying partisan leanings or ideological attitudes of voters within each geographic unit. As a result, all but one of the previous studies use proxy variables constructed from voting data or election outcomes.
1 This is clearly prob-party performance. Ideology is similarly stable 2 . Hence, the evidence provided by the large body of studies on party identi cation suggests that measures based on party identity, rather than voting decisions, would provide us with a valuable tool to address the shortcomings of voting-based measures in testing theories of distributive politics.
In this paper, we use survey data on party identi cation and ideological positions to construct measures of the key independent variables used to test the alternative hypotheses derived from models of distributive politics. In line with the existing literature, our party identi cation and ideological position variables have the desirable property of being very stable and, hence, unlikely to be a ected by short term policies such as the annual budget allocation we are studying. In addition, using this type of data, we can construct a direct measure of the fraction of \swing voters" in each geographic unit, since we have the fraction who call themselves \independents" (not attached to either major party) and \moderates"
(not liberal or conservative). The data are for U.S. states, and the period we study is
1978-2002.
Of course, the use of survey data raises yet another potential methodological problem { measurement error. Survey experts argue that measurement error varies considerably across items. Party identi cation appears to be relatively well measured, at least with respect to criteria such as reliability (inter-temporal stability in panels). 3 Other items, such as ideology, appear much less reliable. While this may be a large problem for studies at the individual level, it is less of a problem for us since our focus is on state-level aggregates. We average over hundreds or even thousands of individuals, so even if there is a large amount of measurement error at the individual level, the measurement error in the aggregated measures should be small.
4
Our results can be easily summarized. We nd little support for any of the three hypotheses listed above. We nd no support for either the swing voter hypothesis or the electoral battleground hypothesis. We nd mixed support for the partisan supporters hypothesis.
2 See Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder (2006) . 3 See, e.g., Converse (1964) and Green et a. (2002) ). 4 See Page and Shapiro (1992) and Stimson (1998) .
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The use of survey data also allows us go further than previous studies. We can also estimate the impact that government spending in a geographic area has on the vote { voting decisions now as the dependent variable and the geographic distribution of funds as an independent variable { using the survey based measures of party identi cation and ideology as controls. We nd that spending has little or no e ect on voters' choices, while partisanship and ideology have massive e ects.
Previous Literature
One of the dominant theories in political economy is the so-called \swing voter" hypothesis. This posits that the allocation of distributive goods will largely go in favor of groups or regions that contain a conspicuous share of voters that are ideologically indi erent between the political parties. While voters with a clear partisan leaning rarely switch their vote to a di erent party, indi erent voters often do. If voters trade o their ideological stances in exchange for public funds and projects, then it is cheaper for politicians to \buy" the votes of these indi erent, or swing, voters, and competition for these voters will lead politicians to allocate disproportionate amounts of federal spending to regions or groups with many indi erent voters. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) , Dixit and Londregan (1995 , 1996 ), and Stromberg (2004 analyze models that capture this logic.
Several studies nd evidence supporting the swing voter models in some contexts, but mixed or no evidence in other contexts. Studies of the allocation of New Deal spending have found some evidence that states with a more volatile presidential vote received more federal support (Wright, 1974; Wallis, 1987 Wallis, , 1996 Fleck, 1999; Fishback, et al., 2003) .
However, Stromberg (2004) shows that these ndings are not robust to the use of panel data methods with state xed e ects. Similarly, in a more recent study on federal budget allocation by contemporary presidents, Larcinese, et al. (2006) nd that states with more frequent presidential vote swings do not receive more funds. All of these studies use lagged presidential vote returns to measure the fraction of swing voters.
5
5 One exception is Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) , who use survey data to construct a measure of the percentage of swing voters in each Swedish region. They nd that the distribution of environmental grants in Sweden is concentrated most heavily in electorally pivotal regions of the country. Unlike us, who focus
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The logic of distributive politics is also a ected by electoral rules. In particular, winnertakes-all systems create incentives to target constituencies that are likely to be pivotal (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 2004) . In other words, battleground districts may be favored both in public policy and campaign resources allocation (Snyder, 1989; Stromberg, 2005) . The competitiveness of elections is particularly important in the U.S. context, where the electoral college system may induce the channeling of resources toward states that are pivotal in the presidential electoral race.
Existing empirical studies do not nd a clear relationship between resource allocation and competitiveness of presidential election at state level. According to Wright (1974) , U.S. states with close presidential races do not receive disproportionately more New Deal spending.
Similarly, Larcinese, et al. (2006) nd no evidence that states with close presidential races receive more federal monies.
6 On the other hand, several studies nd that battleground states receive a disproportionate share of the advertising in presidential campaigns (Colantoni, et al., 1975; Nagler and Leighley, 1990; Stromberg, 2005) . All of these studies use lagged presidential vote returns to measure the two-party balance in each state.
A competing theory of distributive politics is that parties target spending toward loyal voters (Kramer, 1964; Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Sim, 2002; Dasgupta, et al., 2008) . This can be a rational strategy in the context of low-turnout elections such as those in the U.S. If spending primarily mobilizes voters { either directly as a form of advertising or retrospective voting, or indirectly by buying the support of local elites or groups who engage in get-out-the vote e orts { then the marginal bene t to spending an additional dollar will be highest in areas with the highest density of a party's own voters.
on large spending aggregates, they analyze a tiny "ecological grant" program. The distribution of voters' preferences by electoral constituency is estimated by using the Swedish Election Study of 1994: one problem is therefore that such survey is not guaranteed to be statistically representative by constituency. Most importantly, they use spending on 115 municipalities as dependent variable but have only 29 observations for the distribution of voters' preferences (independent variable). This implies that the standard errors reported in their tables are too small: the authors do not appear to have clustered by constituency. 6 Milligan and Smart(2003) nds that closeness of the electoral race has a positive e ect on spending in the Atlantic Canadian provinces, but a negative e ect in Quebec, while Crampton (2003) nds a positive correlation between competitiveness of the race and spending only in Canadian provinces which are not ruled by the liberal party.
Credit-claiming issues may also provide incentives to target core areas. Who will attend the ribbon-cutting ceremonies for new bridges, schools, hospitals, and libraries? In a heavily Democratic area the politicians will almost all be Democrats, and they will leave no doubt about which party is responsible for the locality's good fortune. In electorally marginal areas, however, roughly half of the politicians will be Democrats and half will be Republicans, and the impression is not likely to be so partisan or clear. Neither party may bene t much in terms of net votes (although individual politicians, running as incumbents, may bene t).
It is also possible that spending targeted towards loyal voters could simply re ect the fact that politicians are, at least to some extent, policy oriented 7 . Democratic politicians may prefer spending on policies that tend to bene t Democratic voters, and likewise for
Republicans. These alternative models are not necessarily incompatible with the swing voter hypothesis. It may be the case, for example, that the loyalists of the out-party receive disproportionately small shares of the public dollar, while swing areas and loyal areas do equally well.
Empirically, several studies nd evidence that loyal voters are rewarded. Some studies nd a positive relationship between the share of U.S. federal spending going to an area and the Democratic vote in the area (e.g., Browning, 1973; Ritt, 1976; Owens and Wade, 1984; Levitt and Snyder, 1995) . Since Democrats were the majority party in Congress during the years studied, this provides some support for the idea that federal spoils go to the victors, but the results might also re ect the behavior of the Democratic party or the characteristics of areas that tend to vote Democratic. 8 Some studies of U.S. states nd a positive relationship between spending and past share vote for the incumbent president's party (Fleck, 2003; Larcinese, et al., 2006; Garrett and Sobel, 2003) .
See, for example, the citizen-candidates models of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) .
8 Levitt and Snyder (1995) compare programs passed during years of uni ed Democratic control with programs passed during years of divided government. They nd that programs passed during uni ed Democratic control exhibit a pro-Democratic geographic bias, while those passed during divided government do not. Levitt and Poterba (1999) also nd indirect evidence that the majority party favors its core areas: areas represented by more senior Democrats tend to get more.
9 Studies of the distribution of patronage by urban machines also nd that the organizations in control of their cities tend to reward their core supporters with patronage (Holden, 1973; Rakove, 1975; Erie, 1978;  Finally, other theorists emphasize the importance of factors such as proposal power (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989) , legislative seniority (McKelvey and Riezman, 1992) , over-and under-representation (Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Knight, 2004) , committee structure, presidential leadership, and universalism (Weingast et al., 1981; McCarty, 2000) . If factors such as these are the main drivers of distributive spending, then there may be little relationship between spending and partisanship or ideology. One powerful critique of these measures is that voting behavior is endogenous. Most papers tend to use lagged values of the vote to mitigate the problem somewhat, but this is at best a partial solution for at least two reasons: (i) budgetary processes are sluggish, and spending in any given year depends to a large extent on decisions made in previous years, and (ii) we do not know if voters are \retrospective" or \prospective." If voters are somewhat prospective and parties keep their promises { as assumed in many models of distributive electoral politics { then lagged votes are a function of lagged promises which are equal to (or at least highly correlated with) current spending. There is a third reason to suspect that lagged vote measures are not exogenous: (iii) omitted variables that are correlated both with voting and budgetary decisions. For example, some groups might be especially favored in distributive policies because they are associated with \good values" that citizens wish to preserve (e.g., farmers), and these groups might vote in particular ways (e.g., they might favor conservative parties).
Since the measures used by the current literature to test concurrent theories of distributive politics are clearly endogenous under a variety of assumptions, regression estimates that use them are typically biased. The sign and magnitude of the bias, however, are more di cult to determine. In the simplest cases we can compute the expected bias analytically, but most Johnston, 1979) .
regressions that appear in the literature are fairly complicated, and typically include two or more vote-based measures in the same model. We therefore ran a series of simulated regressions. These allow us to gauge the sign and size of the bias in a set of models that are similar to many of the standard models in the literature.
The simulations show that the endogeneity of voting data can lead to severely biased estimates. More speci cally, using the standard deviation of observed votes rather than the true number of independents can lead either to overestimation or underestimation of the impact of the number of independents on the allocation of federal spending, depending on the speci cation and the set of variables included in the regression. The e ect of an electoral competition is often underestimated but sometimes also overestimated. Finally, using the observed votes to measure the partisanship of a region leads to systematic overestimation of the impact of the number of partisan voters on spending.
We consider the following basic structure. Let j = 1; :::; J index states, and let t = 1; :::; T index years. Assume all states have the same population. Let D j be the fraction of voters in state j who are loyal to party D, let R j be the fraction who are loyal to party R, and let I j be the fraction who are independents (swing voters). Also, letD j = D j =(D j +R j ) be the fraction of all loyalists who are loyal to party D, and letR j = R j =(D j +R j ) = 1 D j . Let C j = 1 jD j R j j be the two-party \competitiveness," or partisan balance, of state j. Let 
(1)
If I > 0, I > 0 and C = P = P = 0 then we have a linearized approximation of the \swing voter" model of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Londregan (1995, 1996) .
0, and C = 0 then we have something like the \machine politics" model of Dixit and Londregran (1996) or the model of Cox and McCubbins (1986), or what Fishbeck, et al. (2003) call the mandate model. Finally, if C > 0, I 0, I 0, P 0, and P = 0, then we have something approximating the model of Milligan and Smart (2005) , or the electoral college model of Colantoni, et al., (1975) , Stromberg (2005) and others.
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If researchers had direct measures of I j , D j and R j , then they could constructC j ,D j andR j , and then directly estimate equations (1) and (2). In almost all cases, however, Rather than constructing complicated historical averages and autocorrelation structures that attempt to incorporate these features more precisely, we simply use contemporaneous voting data freely in our simulated regressions. Let
state j over a sample of T years, and letÎ j = [(1=T )
1=2 be the sample standard deviation. Also, letĈ jt = 1 jṼ D jt Ṽ R jt j be the closeness of the election in state j in year t.
We consider the following speci cations:
We only analyze party D, since analogous speci cations for party R would simply duplicate the results. Note that in Model 4 we use the actual value of I j rather than the vote-based measure. This approximates the \encompassing models" in Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) , which include a survey-based measure of I, but vote-based measure of V D .
In each simulation, we set J = 50 and T = 100, i.e. 50 states over 100 years. Note that this gives much more data on the time dimension than researchers actually have. We do this to focus attention more on the bias produced by endogeneity than on measurement error bias (which also plagues the literature). In all cases, I, D, and R, are drawn from independent uniform distributions on [0; 1]. Also, in each simulation, I, D, and R are xed for all 100 years (i.e., all t = 1; :::; 100). Next, we choose values for the parameters I , C , P , I , and
R from independent uniform distributions. We set the standard deviations of D and R to , and the standard deviations of D and R to .
We focus on four di erent cases. In Case 1 and Case 2 there is no partisan targeting, that is, P = 0. In addition, we assume there is no partisan voter response to transfers, that is, P = 0. The di erence between the two cases is the value of , the degree to which the distribution of transfers across states is determined by random, idiosyncratic factors. In Case 1, = :2, so the idiosyncratic factors are relatively important. In Case 2, = :03, so the idiosyncratic factors are less important. In Case 3 and Case 4 there is partisan targeting, with P = :5. We also assume there is a partisan voter response, with P = :5.
The di erence between the two cases is again the value of , with = :2 in Case 3 and = :03 in Case 4. Inside each case, we vary the parameters I and C . We x I = 1 and = :09 throughout the simulations.
For each vector of parameters we run 10,000 simulated regressions. when the true values of these parameters are both set equal to 0: the columns on the left of Table 1 report the true values in each case. We observe a number of patterns.
First, in most cases the average estimates of a P are biased upward. That is, there is a strong tendency to nd \partisan targeting" predicted by the mandate model or machine politics model, even when it does not exist. The e ect is large when idiosyncratic factors have a large impact on transfers. This is a direct result of the assumption that independent voters respond to transfers in their voting behavior. When one party happens to spend more than the other party in a state { whether due to the exogenous factors captured in D and R , or to actual partisan targeting { then many independent voters will vote for that party, producing a spurious additional correlation between transfers and votes.
Second, the average estimates of a I tend to be biased downward, but are sometimes biased upward. They can even have the wrong sign: this appears to be especially the case when is low and a I is high. The average estimates of a I are not even monotonic in the true value of I , as we can see in the models 2b and 3 of case 3.
Also, the average estimates of a I are often biased even when the true I j are used (model 4): this is because the other vote-based measures are endogenous and may be correlated with I j . In fact, the bias on a I can be even larger using the true I j : this is especially the case when the true I j is low.
Third, the average estimates of a C are sometimes biased downward and sometimes biased upward. When is low the coe cient is generally underestimated, while if is high then the coe cient can be biased both upwards and downwards depending on the speci cation.
The di culty in recovering the true parameters is well illustrated if we consider model 3, which is similar to many speci cations used in the empirical literature. Here when is high (cases 1 and 3) the estimate of P is systematically and substantially upward biased.
If instead is low (cases 2 and 4), then we obtain a much more precise estimate of P :
This comes at the cost, however, of a deterioration in the estimates of I . In fact, there appears to be a trade-o between the consistency of b P and the consistency of b I . The intuition is straightforward. As noted above, a large degree of random variation in the allocation of spending induces more support to be directed at parties simply by voters' reaction to the spending. Many independents therefore act as if they are partisans, generating a spurious positive correlation between observed votes and observed spending. At the same time, however, a more random allocation of funds facilitates the identi cation of the electoral response to spending. Since independent voters respond to spending, random variation in the allocation of funds will produce large uctuations in their voting behavior. The standard deviation of the vote is then a relatively good measure of the proportion of independent voters. In fact, this means that we encounter a type of contradiction: the swing voter hypothesis is testable (using voting data) only insofar as it is false, i.e. only insofar as funds are randomly allocated rather than targeted to independent voters.
The Data
We analyze U.S. federal budget allocation to the states during the period from 1978 to 2002 to test the various hypothesis about distributive politics. We consider three dependent variables: (1) total federal spending per-capita, (2) total spending other than direct transfers to individuals, per-capita, and (3) federal grants per-capita. The second variable should allow us to isolate the most manipulable items in the budget, since it removes the largest of the \non-discretionary" or \entitlement" programs, such as Social Security, Medicare, pensions for public o cials, AFDC (TANF), etc.
13 The third variable is arguably the most targetable;
and while it is much smaller than (1) or (2) it still constitutes an important part of state nances. In all cases, our dependent variables are outlays.
It is important to consider that there is a lag between the appropriation and the spending of federal funds. This is relevant when estimating the e ect of particular institutional and political variables, since current federal outlays have normally been appropriated in previous calendar years. For this reason, we will always consider lagged values of the political explanatory variables.
As noted above, one of the main independent variable of interest is the percentage of swing voters in a state. We use survey data to measure the share of \independents" (and also the share of Democratics and Republicans). These data are from exit polls conducted by various news organizations { CBS News, CBS News/New York Times, ABC News, ABC News/Washington Post, and Voter News Service. 14 Voters are interviewed brie y after leaving the polling booth, and asked how they voted. 15 In addition, voters are asked a series of questions about their demographic and socio-economic characteristics, questions about the reasons for their vote choice, and, sometimes, questions about salient policy issues.
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Using this information we can construct state-level variables reporting the percentage of voters that declare themselves Democratic, Republican or Independent. Due to the relatively small number of interviewed in some states in some years, we aggregate the results over fouryear periods (two elections).
One concern is how well these data can capture the distribution of partisanship within states. This issue is discussed extensively in Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) , who conclude that the partisanship measures derived from the surveys correlate in the expected way with observable other criteria like other polls, election returns and party registration. A number of checks induce us to think that these data capture the underlying distribution of partisanship by state quite well and that they are preferable to using simple voting results. suggest and that using voting to measure partisanship can therefore be problematic.
16 In gure 4 we report the standard deviation (over the period we consider) of presidential Democratic votes by state and compare with the standard deviation of party identi cation: again, this gure suggests that partisanship is much less volatile than voting. Hence, our survey data con rm the stable pattern of party identity variables found by other studies supporting the notion of party identity as a long term stable personal characteristic 17 as opposed to the 16 Consistent with Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) , partisanship also appears rather stable over time, or smoothly changing in some states.
17 For example, in Green et al (2002) , partisanship also appears rather stable over time or smoothly 14 variable pattern of voting data.
One key prediction of the swing voter hypothesis is that states that have more Independents should receive more federal funds. The alternative theories of distributive politics conjecture that the competitiveness of elections and the share of loyal voters may also affect the distribution of federal funds to the states. Thus, we will test these predictions by using measures of the share of independents, of electoral closeness and of loyal voters that, di erently from previous work, are not based on actual voting data but on survey data.
Indicating with Dem, Rep, and Ind, respectively the share of Democrats, Republicans and Independents, we use Ind to measure the share of independents and (1 jDem Repj) to measure closeness.
We tried other measures of partisan and independent voters as well. Some voters may be \cross-pressured," in the sense that they identify themselves with a party that is not the closest on the ideological dimension. This is the case for liberal Republicans (not uncommon in the northeast) and conservative Democrats (still common in the south and west). Such voters are probably more prone to defect in any given election. Thus, we considered an alternative measure of independent voters, in which cross-pressured voters are included with the self-identi ed independents. In this speci cation, partisan Democratic voters will therefore only be either liberal or moderate, while Republicans will only be either conservative or moderate. The substantive conclusions do not change when we use these variables, so we do not report the results 18 .
As discussed in the introduction, swing voter models predict that states with higher partisan and/or ideological balance should receive less funds, while the opposite is predicted by models that stress the importance of loyal voters. If legislators reward their supporters, we should observe that incumbents divert money toward states with high shares of voters ideologically leaning toward the incumbent legislator. In the U.S. institutional setting the changing in some states, and Goren (2005) The sources for all variables used in our analysis are reported in Table 4 .
Results
The simulation exercise shows that regressions based on voting data can be substantially biased. By using more exogenous measures based on exit polls, we should be able to obtain less biased estimates. It is therefore important to compare the results in the two cases to verify whether we obtain di erent estimates. We can then use the simulation exercise as a benchmark to evaluate the potential bias in estimated coe cients.
The key test of the swing voter model is whether the coe cients on the share of indepen- 19 We constructed analogous variables using the party a liation of the majority in the house (House Majority Copartisans) and senate (Senate Majority Copartisans) as well as the political a liation of state senators (Senator Copartisans). The results are substantively the same as those obtained in the case of president a liation. We do not report them here but they are available from the authors upon request.
20 The total population size captures the e ects of malapportionment of the U.S. Senate, as small states are extremely over-represented. It may, however, also capture budgetary lags. Because of \incremental budgeting," the growth of the population is likely to negatively a ect the levels of expenditure per capita. If there are lags in adjusting the allocation of transfers to population shifts, then, as a state population grows its per-capita transfers will automatically fall. Economies of scale might also lead to a negative e ect of population on per-capita transfers. dents is positive. We compare, therefore, the results obtained when the share of independents from the exit polls is used as explanatory variable with the results obtained when observed votes are used. In this case we use the standard deviation of Democratic vote in the previous three presidential elections. The \battleground state" hypothesis stresses the role of the state marginality: thus, we also estimate regressions with closeness as explanatory variable for spending. Results when the competitiveness of electoral races is measured using exit polls can then be compared with regressions when closeness is measured by using voting data. Finally, we test the alternative possibility that loyal voters get more funds. Again, we compare results when the share of votes for the incumbent president is used as explanatory variable with results when exit polls partisan measures are used instead.
To check the robustness of our results we consider several possible variants of these basic models. We rst consider speci cations in which swing, pivotality and partisan measures are all included in the same regression. Since swing, pivotality, and partisanship are somewhat correlated, and since the various hypotheses regarding these variables are not logically incompatible with each other, speci cations that include only one variable at a time might su er from omitted variable bias. We also consider the possibility that the share of swing Using yearly data when voting data are not available for each year (and the closest past election is therefore imputed to subsequent years) can generate autocorrelation in the residuals with the potential problems this generates for standard errors estimates. Hence, in addition to using state-level clustered standard errors, we also run term-based regressions, 21 Results are available from the authors upon request.
in which each presidential term is collapsed into one observation and the spending and other control variables are averaged over the period.
Finally, we study three alternative dependent variables. In one speci cation we use targetable spending, i.e. we remove from total federal expenditure the least manipulable categories such as entitlements. In another speci cation we use federal grants rather than total spending. Grants contain a larger share of discretionary spending and also often provide the state government with some discretion over the way money is spent. Thus, receiving more grants should be favorably regarded both by the citizens and by the administrators of a given state.
Since we consider a large number of speci cations, we only report the coe cients of our variables of interest in the main text. 22 These are reported in Table 2 . We should point out that for the standard control variables, we do not nd any signi cant surprises or noticeable di erences across the various speci cations. The percentage of aged has a positive and signi cant e ect on total federal outlays, while the percentage of school-age children has a negative signi cant impact. The coe cient of population (in logarithm) is negative and signi cant in most speci cations, while the coe cient of income per capita is negative and signi cant only when xed e ects are introduced.
Share of swing voters
The key test of the swing voter hypothesis consists in verifying whether the relationship between the share of independents and spending is positive. We begin with a simple scatterplot of the collapsed data, averaged over the period . This is shown in gure 5. In each of the four graphs, the y-axis is average federal spending other than direct transfers. where we found that the coe cient of the share of independent voters tend to be biased downward when voting data are used and can even assume a negative sign while the true parameter is positive. This result is particularly evident when we compare model 7 and 8,
i.e. when we also consider closeness and partisan alignment within the same speci cation.
A negative sign for in model 8 (when voting data are used) is much more common (and signi cant, in some cases) than a negative sign for in model 7 (when exit poll data are used).
Hence, we do not nd support for the basic prediction of the swing voter model. States with more independent voters do not receive more federal funds. Also, while based on the regressions with voting data one might be tempted to conclude that states with more independents may actually be penalized, we can in fact conclude, also on the basis of our simulation exercise, that the negative sign is most likely due to endogeneity problems.
Battleground states
We conduct a similar investigation focusing on the \competitiveness" of the electoral race for presidential elections. This time the results using poll data (model 3) and voting data (model 4) are quite similar. The coe cient for a close race is negative, i.e. states with closer races receive less funds. This runs against the predictions of models based on the swing voter logic. This result, however, only holds in cross section analysis and is not robust to the introduction of state xed e ects in the case of total and targetable spending, although in this last case the coe cients are not signi cant. The situation is reversed when we consider grants: now the negative sign prevails when state xed e ects are introduced but vanishes in cross section analysis. The magnitude of the negative e ect of closeness is larger when we use poll data measures (with the exception of grants regressions). There is one important di erence between the voting and the exit poll regressions: in the rst case, the results are not robust to the introduction of other political variables (model 8), while the results in model 7 (poll data) are surprisingly similar to those of model 3. A prevalence of the negative sign remains when we remove the cross-pressured voters from the bulk of the partisans (not reported).
The main conclusion that we derive is that, when signi cant, the coe cient displays a sign which is opposite to what the \battleground states" hypothesis would predict. Using voting data delivers a very incoherent set of results, and this again conforms to the variability that we found in the simulation exercise. However, using the poll data does not seem to 20 make any substantial di erence in this case, although the results appear more robust to speci cation variations, at least in term of the signi cance of the coe cients.
Partisan supporters
An alternative to the swing voter hypothesis is that politicians reward loyal voters. We consider this possibility from the presidential point of view since this is most common in the literature. Thus, we rst consider the share of vote for the incumbent president's party as the relevant measure of state partisanship and use it as an explanatory variable of spending. On the other side, from the exit polls we know the share of voters who identify themselves with each party and can therefore use this variable to measure partisanship. These alternative measures are considered in models 5 and 6. Looking at Table 2 , it is clear that this is the only hypothesis that even receives partial support from the data. It is also clear, however, that using voting data to measure partisanship (model 6) leads to a signi cant overestimation of this e ect. This is consistent with the ndings of our simulation exercise. In model 6, the partisan share coe cient is always positive and, in some cases, signi cant at the 5% level. In model 5 the only signi cant coe cients are again positive; this time, however, some negative coe cients occur and the magnitude of the e ect is generally (although not always) smaller. Introducing other political variables (model 7 and 8) induces some changes in magnitudes and signi cance levels. In this case the polling data measure of partisanship is always positive and, in four cases, signi cant at the 10% level. Detracting cross-pressured voters from the count of the partisans do not alter in any signi cant way these results. We conclude that this is the only hypothesis for which we nd signi cant coe cients with the correct sign and never a signi cant coe cient with the wrong sign, just the opposite of what we found in the previous cases.
E ects of Government Expenditures on Subsequent Voting
Our previous results cast some doubt on the idea that voters are responsive to the receipt of federal funds. In fact, one of the premises of the swing voter model is that politicians can buy votes by favoring certain groups in terms of spending allocation: swing voters are 21 then simply cheaper to buy, given their lack of unconditional attachment to a given party.
Hence, in this section we turn to the other side of the coin, and ask whether voters do in fact respond to favorable spending by rewarding incumbent politicians. By using exit poll data we estimate the impact of federal spending on individual voting decisions, controlling for partisanship and ideological leaning. Including such controls means that, to a large extent, we mitigate possible endogeneity problems for the spending variable.
We analyze voting decisions in presidential, gubernatorial, senate and house elections. In the rst three cases, the swing voter model would posit that incumbents are rewarded for the receipts of federal funds and therefore the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the voter chooses the incumbent (or a candidate from the incumbent's party). In the case of the House we cannot predict how funds (which are measured at the state level) should a ect voting for particular incumbents, given that within a state there are simultaneously many House representatives, usually from both parties. Moreover, we only know the state of each voter, not her district. Thus, in this case the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a vote is cast for a Democratic candidate, and the explanatory variable of interest is an interaction term between the amounts received and the share of Democratic representatives from the state.
23 Table 2 reports our estimations when total federal expenditure in the state is used as explanatory variable. It is clear that the fact that a state receives more federal funds does not induce its citizens to cast more votes in favor of incumbents. The coe cient of total federal expenditure can be even negative and never reaches a 5% signi cance level, in spite of the very large number of observations. On the contrary, partisanship and ideology have massive e ects. These results are consistent with Bartels (2005) who nds evidence of a strong impact of partisanship on voting behavior both at presidential and congressional level.
When we use targetable spending, our results do not show substantial variations, with the exception of a positive coe cient on the probability of voting for an incumbent governor.
Even in this case, however, the signi cance level (10%) appears rather weak for a sample of this size. For presidential election we encounter again a negative coe cient although only signi cant at the 10% level. Grants are totally insigni cant in the president, governor and senator equations. They appear instead to have a positive impact in the probability of voting for a Democrat in Congress when the majority of state representatives in Congress is
Democrat. This is the only coe cient we encounter which turns out to be signi cant at the 5% level. Although this could be the consequence of the speci cation we use (not being able to identify the district of the voters), this is also consistent with related ndings by Stein and Bickers (1994) and Levitt and Snyder (1995) .
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Overall, the evidence that receiving more federal funds induces voters to reward incumbent politicians is rather weak. 25 One possible objection to this conclusion is that, according
to swing voter models, in equilibrium, both candidates converge on the same platform: hence, in equilibrium, we should expect no e ect, but this does not imply that voters would not react to spending proposals. The idea that electoral competition brings platform convergence appears, in reality, to run against historical evidence. The two major American parties have often proposed very di erent platforms on spending as well as on other matters. 26 Although identifying causal relationships is not straightforward, there appears to be a clear correlation between the platform proposals and the implemented policies, which is consistent with the \mandate" model (Budge and Ho erbert, 1990; King and Laver 1993) . At the district level the situation does not appear much di erent: individual candidates for the House have also 24 The estimates reported in Table 3 assume that all voters should be a ected in the same way by the receipt of federal funds. This is not necessarily the case. Hence, we have considered speci cations that introduce interactions between the spending variables and the partisanship and ideological variables. The results suggest that heterogeneous responses are sometimes possible but that, overall, these e ects are hardly statistically signi cant, particularly considering the size of the sample. Detailed results are reported in the appendix.
25 Some other studies in the literature also nd insigni cant e ects of state expenditure on voting, e.g. Besley (2006) .
26 See, for example, Sundquist (1983) . The di erent stances on the role of public spending to stimulate the economy taken by the Democrats and the Republicans during the great depression constitute a prime example of policy platform divergence on spending issues, and one that has had long lasting consequences on the subsequent evolution of the two parties.
been shown to systematically assume divergent positions (Erikson and Wright, 1997; Ansolabehere, et al., 2001) . Another possible explanation for our ndings is that although parties (or candidates) do not converge, our estimates nonetheless capture equilibrium behavior that masks structural coe cients. Suppose, for example, that candidates typically manage to meet voters' expectations, or ful ll their campaign promises, regarding spending. Then we may nd little correlation in the data because we do not observe \out-of-equilibrium" behavior. Thus, while our ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that voters rarely respond with their votes to public spending in a clear and systematic way, further research is clearly needed to rule out other possibilities.
Conclusion
Our ndings regarding the allocation of federal spending across U.S. states are disappointing for formal theories of distributive politics, but are good news for the working of U.S. institutions, designed to provide checks and balances, hence preventing legislators from abusing their power by tailoring budget allocations to their political goals. We nd no support for the notion that parties target areas with high numbers of swing voters. We also nd no support for the notion that parties target battleground states. We nd limited and mixed support for the notion that parties target areas with high numbers of their partisan supporters. Since we nd no signi cant e ect of distributive spending on voting decisions, it seems most likely that, to the extent that partisan targeting occurs, it is driven more by the policy-motivations of politicians than by strategic calculations to win electoral support.
Our ndings might re ect features of distributive politics that are particular to the U.S..
Congress is one of the most powerful and decentralized national legislatures in the world. It jealously guards its control over the public purse. Committees are powerful, and jealously guard their own jurisdictions. Strong norms of seniority rule give committee leaders and members a substantial degree of independence from party leaders. Individual senators and representatives frequently pursue their own re-election goals, working to \bring home the bacon" for their state or district. The federal structure of the U.S., with strong and autonomous state governments, further complicates the situation. For example, many federal grants to states are either matching or project grants, and decisions by state governments therefore a ect where federal money ows. As a result, the executive may have relatively little in uence over the geographic distribution of federal expenditures. Perhaps, even though administrators and party leaders would like to target swing states or swing voters, they cannot. Further investigations in other institutional settings are necessary to establish the validity of this conclusion. ME ME ME ME ME ME Each cell corresponds to a regression, of which only the relevant coefficient is reported. Detailed results can be found in the Statistical Appendix. Indicating with I the share of independents, with σ the standard deviation of Democratic vote, with CP and CV the closeness between the two main parties measured, respectively, using poll and voting data and with PP and PV the share of partisan supporters for the incumbent president measured, respectively, with poll and voting data, the more general models are specified as follows: where X is expenditure (federal expenditure, targetable spending or grants), Z are control variables (real income per capita, share of population aged 5-17, share of elderly, total population), s stands for state and t for the time unit (year or presidential term). Model 1 and model 2 set γ=δ=0 and use, respectively, I and σ. Models 3 and 4 set β=δ=0 and use, respectively, CP and CV. Models 5 and 6 set β=γ=0 and use, respectively, PP and PV. All regressions are repeated both with and without ηs (as indicated). When fixed effects are not used we introduce control dummies for Maryland, Virginia and New Mexico. Robust z-statistics in parentheses (clustered by state). * indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
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